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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah
corporation, and NORTON
PARKER, an individual,
Defendants-Appellant,

v.

Case No.

15337

GLOBE LEASING CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; AL WEIGELT
and GLORIA MORRISON, individuals,
Plaintiffs-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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OPENING STATEMENT
Respondent accepts without reservation appellant's
statement of the Nature of the Case and Disposition in Lower
court.

Respondent accepts appellant's abstract of the trial

transcript in toto.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In order to expedite the review of this Court, respondent will accept appellant's Statement of Facts with those reservations pointed out in the Argument.

Throughout the Argument

this Court's attention will be directed to any facts taken out
of context by the appellant and those facts which are misleading
or are incorrect statements of fact or law.
Respondent will also point out that appellant often
relies on general rules of law as stated in secondary sources but
has apparently neglected to read the cases annotated therein
which creates distortion and misstatements of certain rules.
Any statements or arguments of the appellant not specifically challenged hereinafter are submitted to this Court on
their own merits.

-

1 -
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT APPELLANT
IS LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE
BUSINESS RELATIONS OF THE RESPONDENT.
Appellant's Brief correctly states the rule of law
in Utah (Mason v. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730 (1945) as
applied to the instant case.

Respondent would iterate and em-

phasize one sentence therein " .•• A judgment in conformity with
the findings will not be disturbed."
Appellant asserts, inter alia, that one of the Court':
Findings of Facts, i.e., that the bank impounded funds in Globe
accounts at the bank, is not alleged in any of the causes of
action set forth in the Complaint.

Appellant, therefore, ignon

count eleven of the first cause of action, "That the Bank of Sai·
Lake failed to credit Globe Leasing Corporation's checking acco'
for the proceeds of the three leases and that upon subsequent
inquiry by the personnel of Globe Leasing Corporation, the reor'
sentative of the defendant, Bank of Salt Lake, on or about July i.
1974, advised plaintiff, Globe Leasing Corporation, that the
leases would not be honored and that Globe Leasing Corporation
account would not be credited with amounts representing proce~
of the three leases."

It is certainly not inconceivable that

the Court below found the actions of the bank, in effect seiz·
ing the value of the three leases, tantamount to impounding
funds belonging to Globe.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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However, if appellant insists that the Court mistakenly had reference to the two accounts of Globe at the bank
which were in fact frozen by the bank (cf Tr. 63,

testimony

of Mr. Weigelt and Tr. Vol. II 173, testimony of Mr. Stats) and
overlooked that the impoundment of some $3,800 [sic]

(Tr. Vol. II

173) by the bank was not alleged in any of the causes of action
included in the Court's Findings of Fact, appellant should be
aware that such erroneous findings have consistently been held
by this Court and the majority of jurisdictions to be but harmless error.
Chournos v. Evona Investment Company, 97 Utah 335,
rehearing denied 97 Utah 346, 93 P.2d 450, 453, rehearing denied
94 P.2d 470

(1939), stands for the proposition that an erroneous

finding by the Court below will not constitute a ground for
reversal where, as here, appellant was not prejudiced thereby.
The leading California cases on point go even further.
In Gray v. Janss Investment Company, 196 Cal. 634, 200 P. 401, 404 (1921),
the Supreme Court of California ruled that a variance in the pleadings and the findings which "could not have so misled or surprised the defendants as to have placed them at a disadvantage ..•
cannot be held to warrant the reversal of the judgment.
Where a case proceeds upon the hypothesis
that an issue has been raised and findings are
made upon such an issue, the complaint becomes
immaterial and judgment on the findings will
be uoheld.
(Citations omitted). A finding is
not to be overthrown merely because it is more

-

3 -
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specific than the allegation.
Ramos v. Pacheco,
64 C.A.2d 304, 148 P.2d 704, 707 (1944).
The evidence before the Court below clearly demonstra'.
that the bank could have been in no way surprised by the asserti:
that they impounded Globe' s funds.
Motion to Release (those same)

The record shows that Globe':

Im~ounded

Funds was argued and

a minute order entered on August 13, 1974 that the bank "place
the impounded funds in a position to draw the highest interest
available"

(awaiting final disposition of the lawsuit.)
The issue of the impounded funds in the two Globe accq

was raised at trial considerably by both sides and, as in Ramos,
is more specific than the Complaint.

The significance of a few

thousand dollars to the whole of the Findings and Conclusions
is hardly significant and is not prejudicial to appellant's
case.

Appellant's assertion, therefore, if correct, is harm-

less error, and the other Findings set forth are sufficient
to sustain the judgment.
It is a well settled rule of law in Utah that error
in the Findings notwithstanding, if there are other Findings
which can sustain the judgment, then the judgment shall be sus·
tained.

That rule, stated by this Court in Thomas v. Foulger,

71 Utah 274, 264 P. 975 (1928), has not been seriourly challenged.
Appellant also argues that respondent's theory of
recovery is "injurious falsehood" or "disparagement" as summar·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 4 -

ized by W. L. Prosser in his Handbook of the Law of Torts,
§

128 at 919

(4th ed. 1971) and cites two Utah cases as sup-

port of Prosser' s theory; Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d
644 (1954) and Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock,
18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966).
Respondent would point out to the Court that both
Pender and Western States Title are slander of title actions.
Pender can be distinguished from the instant case
in that the defendant had a valid judgment for costs against
the plaintiff.

(emphasis added)

His acts in having the execution issued,
levying on the property and having it sold
at sheriff's sale all reflected the true
nature of the claim; that is, that these
actions were taken to satisfy a judgment
for costs .... (at 650).
(emphasis added).
The bank is now before this Court having actually damaged the respondent's business reputation without benefit of
legal process at the time of the injury.

In the instant case

the bank performed the various acts complained of thereby foreing the other party (Globe) to resort to the courts.
added).

(emphasis

The two cases are squarely in opposition.
Western States Title, plaintiff and appellant, was

denied relief by this Court:
Unless we hold that the language claimed
to constitute a libel is libelous per se,
since plaintiff does not allege any special
damages (therefrom) the ruling of the trial
court cannot be reversed.
(emphasis added).
Globe alleged, and proved to the satisfaction of the

lrial court,
its damages.
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Furthermore, respondent does not accept fully appellant's proffer of Prosser as the controlling authority.
§

86 C.J.'

43 at 956 and 957 (citing cases) avers that wrongful interfer-

ence with prospective contracts or the right to pursue a lawful
business, calling, trade or occupation has been "generally

he~

to constitute a tort, ..•. Even though no wrongful or unlawful
means are employed to accomplish the result .... "

Prosser's

"injurious falsehood" and "disparagement" theory has only been
accepted in the courts of five states (New York, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Illinois and Florida) on a limited basis and in only
one Federal District Court (New York).

86 C.J.S. 48 at 971.

Appellant addresses argument to tortious interference
with contractual relations in Appellant's Brief at 14 which
asserts, "Obviously, an element of that cause of action is inter·
ference with some existing contractual relationship of the plain·
tiff.

Specifically the action is for inducing a party to breach

a contract with plaintiff."
this Court.

Appellant is attempting to mislead

As has been briefly mentioned, supra, the lost

business profits prayed for in this action were those profits
to be derived from prospective contracts over the years.

The

amount of loss which resulted from the interference with the
existing sixty or so leases is miniscule as compared to the pro·
fits to be expected in future years as estimated by Mr. Stuart.
That area will be more thoroughly covered, infra.

- 6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant also argues at length that the Court below
enumerated its Findings of Fact without any mention of the bank's
purported privilege to interfere with the business of Globe.
Appellant cites Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Association,
11 Utah 2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018, 1022 as authority for the privileged inducement of breach of contract.

Again, we are not so

much concerned with the breach of existing contracts as we are
Globe's inability to continue in business and acquire additional
contracts.

The language in Gammon speaks to a different propo-

sition anyway, i.e., that the privilege spoken of is "an absolute
right - that is, an act which a person has a definite legal right
to do without any qualification."

(emphasis added).

The "qualifications" are apparent throughout the trial
record.
In the first place, the bank relies on after the fact
knowledge to assert their so-called right or privilege.

The

bank's president at the time of the termination of the agreement
with Globe, Mr. Parker, testified that the bank was not even
aware of the "double financing matter"

(Tr. Vol. II 128) until

after the actions of the bank complained of herein.

Nor could

the bank have had any knowledge of the "forged lease" until
some time after the funds were frozen

(Tr. 151, 152).

The

bank surely does not rely on Globe's use of the "security dePosits" to assert its so-called privilege.

Mr. Stuart testi-

fied without objection thereto that not only leasing companies
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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but also banks and "all types of businesses" traditionally and
commonly use security deposits as working capital.

For the bank

then to assert that the conversion of deposits into working capi:
is not good practice for a leasing company but is all right if
you're a bank is disingenuous and self-serving.
The strongest inference to be drawn from Mr. Parker's
testimony is that the bank "pulled the plug," on Globe because
Globe had grossly exceeded their lending limits and had underta\
too many leases with a company, Leisureamerica, which was not
credit worthy (Tr. Vol. II 92 and 97).
The tenuous nature of appellant's position on that
matter is pointed out through the testimony of Mr. Perry, who, a:
the time in question was the bank employee with the immediate
authority to approve the Globe lease agreements.

Mr. Perry tes·

tified that the bank had final approval or veto power on all ere·
dit applications of potential leases proposed by Globe (Tr. Vol.
The credit information was telephoned to the bank t:

18 and 19) .

Globe whereupon they conducted their own "independent investigat
About one third of the credit applications were not approved by
the bank.

Some of the applications might have gotten through

without approval.

However, there was nothing in the record to

indicate anyone other than the bank was at fault for that.
1.

Since Globe had no control over approval of credi'

how can the bank tortiously assert their "privilege"
against Globe because the bank itself was the one
who approved too much credit out through Globe accour
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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2.

Likewise, since the bank had total control over

credit approval, where is the justification for
alarm over the numerous leases out to Leisureamerica?
While respondent agrees there is basis for alarm, it
is the bank and not Globe which appears from the record
to be in need of policing.
Further negating any privilege which might arise under
the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9 (70A-9-502 Utah Code Anno.,
1953) is the pure and simple fact that appellant could not prove
at trial that Globe was in default on July 15, 1974 when appellant
froze Globe's funds.

The Court below specifically found no such

default at the time the funds were frozen.
Furthermore, in the case cited by appellant as the law
in our state concerning the necessity for specific Findings of
Fact upon all the material issues, Legrand Johnson Corp. v.
Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966), this Court was
faced with a very different and unusual decision.
We are at a loss to understand why no findings
of fact were made in the instant case. 420 P.2d
616.
This Court was disturbed that absolutely no Findings
of Fact were presented by the trial judge.

In the instant case

the trial judge has enumerated seventeen Findings of Fact.That
the Court was convinced no absolute right or privilege existed
in the bank is implicit in the Findings.

If the Court below

chose to find such a privilege, the Court could have done so
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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since the privilege grows out of the same relationship the acts
complained of arose from.

Respondent asserts that by finding

that the bank's acts were tortious the Court implicitly found no
privilege because one did not exist.
One additional attempt by appellant, in their (mis) StatE·
ment of Fact, to attribute culpable behavior to Globe in order to
justify the bank's tortious freezing of the Globe accounts should
be briefly mentioned.

In Appellant's Brief at page seven it is

explained that the bank at first advanced credit to Globe on eact
lease for the amount of each lease but that Globe later "changed I
that practice" and began getting an additional 10%
Vol. II 57, 123).

Now who holds the cards here?

(Tr. 12-13, 41-l
As in the afore·

mentioned credit approvals/investigations and the Leisureamerica
leases i t is the bank in the position to approve or deny and it
is the bank who now comes before this Court and says "we did it
wrong and now we want our money back."

Further, a more careful

reading of the trial transcript quoted above will reflect that
Mr. Perry, albeit reluctantly, approved Globe's practice of adfo
10% to the price of each lease.
II.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT APPELLANT TORTIOUSLY
INTERFERED WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONS OF
THE RESPONDENT.
As already pointed out above, the Findings of Fact
are sufficient to support the Conclusions of Law in this matter

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A.

That the bank's actions herein complained of

were sufficient to create the innuendo of lack of credit worthiness is apparent from the record.

Appellant's Brief at pages 18

and 19 admits that Globe was not delinquent in any of its payments
to the bank, then dismisses Globe's payment record as insubstantial in light of its use of security deposits as operative
capital (a common 9ractice in the business according to the
evidence); Globe's double financing of one automobile (a fact
unknown to the bank at the time of their actions); the issuance
of a forged lease (again, only known to the bank after the actions
of July 15 and furthermore, the evidence did not inculpate any
of Globe's employees or agents re the forgery); and Globe's
thin capitalization (which was known to the bank before they
extended nearly

$400,000 in credit).

The bank does not dispute that their actions put Globe
out of business, i.e., created the innuendo and the atmosphere
whereby Globe could not obtain further financing after having
relied to their detriment on the bank.

The bank merely alleges

misconduct on the part of Globe after the damage is done.

Re-

spondent submits that the bank merely panicked at the sight of
so much money being out to one account, then set out to eliminate that problem by eliminating the account itself, i.e., Globe,
rather than policing the same and now comes before this Court
and says, "yeah, but we were right after all."

- 11 -

Respondents
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do not deny the bank their right to correct their mistakes;
however, the issue here is that in doing so, they don't cause
injury to others as they have chosen to do here.
It is not totally without significance that Mr. Parker
may have never known about the abundance of Globe leases had
he not observed a "very striking lady"
to see her file (Tr. 92).

(Mrs. Weigelt) and asked

We are left to wonder whether or not

Globe would be a flourishing business today if Mr. Weigelt's
taste in women were not so good.

B.

Appellant again speaks of privilege and claims a

statutory right (Appellant's Brief at page 19) to take the actior
it did.

In plain fact there is no such statutory right.

Appel·

lant mentions no statute; the record contains no such statute.
If appellant is referring to Article 9 of the U. C. c.

,

respondent

would stipulate that that is the test (70A-9-502 Utah Code Anno.,
1953); however, by appellant's own admission that the Globe accod
were not delinquent, it is Globe and not the bank who should finci
comfort with Article 9.
Appellant cites Flinco, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and R~
Company, 17 Utah 2d 173, 406 P.2d 911 as authority for its right
to terminate an existing contract.

A closer reading of that de·

cision shows that Goodyear terminated its contract by giving
thirty days' written notice pursuant to a specific term, paragraph 14," of the contract.

- 12 -
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If appellant relies on Flinco, then appellant impliedly
relies on the written terms of each existing lease assignment.
Exhibit 20-P to the trial transcript is one such representative
agreement.

Paragraph five sets forth default in payment, inter

alia, as the basis for terminating the contract.

Paragraph six

is titled "REMEDIES" and directs the Secured Party to the

u.c.c.,

inter alia, for redress for the default.
After citing Flinco the appellant states that oral notice
was given to Globe followed by written notice (telegram).

In

fact, the record is devoid of any such oral notification.
Appellant makes a very strong argument that case law
and the Utah Code Annotated allows appellant to terminate the
agreement in question "at will" and without any default by resoondent.
Appellant cites the language of 70A-l-208, Utah Code
Anno., 1953 wherein appellant may so act "at will" or "when he
deems himself insecure," etc.

The Code also states in that same

sentence of that same section •.. "(H)e shall have power to do
so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired."

It is obvious that the court

below found the element of good faith to be absent.
Appellant believes Mr. Norton Parker's good faith can
be found in his concern over the Leisureamerica leases (which,
interestingly enough after all was said and done about their
doubtful credit worthiness, the record reflects that Leisureamerica was not in default) ; the lack of bank authorization for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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some leases (however, as argued previously, the bank's own for.
bearance is not in any way attributable to Globe, Leasureamerici
or any other entity other than the bank); and

~r.

Parker's

"belief" that someone at the bank was being "paid off" by Globe,
This latter rather incredible accusation is not supported by
even one shred of evidence at any point in the record and, in
fact,

there is no evidence that the bank believed the theory

strongly enough to pursue the possibility of internal misconduct.

The bank allowed their lending to go unchecked and get

out of hand, then came in attempting to point the finger at
one of their own employees in order to justify closing down
the respondent's business.
Appellant cites First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.
Wright, 521 P. 2d 563 (1974) as a case being "directly on point"
re lack of tortious interference liability for giving notice of
one's security interest.

Actually the case goes much deeper th;:

that and supports respondent's position.
First Security, on this issue, is a bifurcated decisic:
(at 567) wherein Justice Crockett, writing for the majority,
said:
The first is that a creditor who has a
security interest in personal property
has a right to notify any third party
of his interest; and doing so does not
constitute an actionable interference
with the debtor's business.
Of course we know in this case we had more than mere
notice of a security interest.

We had intentional, affirmatl'''
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acts by the bank which far exceeded the mere notice spoken of
by Crockett, J.

However, the stronger basis for the ruling

seems to be that the defendant (Wright) :
(D)id not make nor proffer any sufficient
proof to justify a finding that he suffered
compensable damage to his business as a result of First Security giving notice to the
named debtors.
Respondent has shown such proof of loss through its
witnesses and the trial court accepted said proffer as the Findings and Conclusions so indicate.
C.

In attempting to deny that the Bank's actions

were the proximate cause of Globe's demise, appellant first
asserts that Globe presented no evidence to show their ability
to buy automobiles from automobile dealers was in any way diminished.

The plain and simple fact of the matter is you can't

buy cars without money to pay for them.
absurd with respect to that assertion.

Appellant's position is
If Globe could have

"borrowed" the cars they needed for their leasing business,
they would not have had to seek financing from the bank in the
first place.

Appellant's comments about Globe's credit repu-

tation with such dealers "not (being) very good in any event"
are self-serving and not relevant.

Even if that were the case,

you don't need credit if you pay cash ... and that was what
Globe was doing before the bank withdrew its line of credit.
Appellant also claims that there is no evidence that
~urrent

or prospective lessees refrained from doing business
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with Globe.

We suppose that is because there was no more Globe

to do business with, i.e., the bank's actions put Globe out of
business.

If certain of the lessees were confused by the "clear

language" of their lease agreements (Appellant's Brief at page
27) it was only through the confusion brought about by the actio:
of the bank.

Appellant suggests in the Brief that perhaps the

confusion was due to "some representation by Globe's Mr. Weigel:
that, notwithstanding such language, he would not assign the
leases."

Such self-serving comments are not only not contained

anywhere in the record--no such conduct by Mr. Weigelt was even

I

suggested at trial by appellant's counsel or appellant's wit-

i

nesses.
As to appellant's claim that Globe had failed to show
they could not obtain financing from other financial institution'
after the bank's actions, one only has to wonder what bank or
loan company will advance a loan to a company that has just had
its line of credit taken away and has just been put out of the
leasing business by another financial institution.

When some-

one loses a leg due to a tortious act, the courts don't demand
the victim try all of the hospitals to try to get the severed
leg sewn back on before resorting to an action in tort.

The

irreparable damage had already been done.
If, as appellant claims, the Bank of Salt Lake was
the only place Globe could obtain financing and then the bank
terminated Globe and then Globe necessarily went out of busi·
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ness, it would only seem to make the issue of proximate cause
more clear.

Further, it is common knowledge that fledgling

businesses build their credit reputation as they grow, buy and
sell, and generally perform in the commercial world much like
a young married couple builds their credit up through purchases,
loans, etc.

While it's true in July 1973 the Bank of Salt Lake

loaned money to Globe when others would not, after one year of
performing without delinquent accounts, with an increase of business to include some 64 leases worth some $400,000 and a good
overall "track record" as the expert witness, Mr. Stuart, testified (Tr. 220), it would seem that Globe's credit worthiness
would have to have been enhanced considerably, if however, the
bank had not pulled the rug out from under all that.

The test

is not whether Globe could borrow money after July 15, 1974, but
whether they could have borrowed from another bank on July 14,
1974.

Aside from the one loan from valley State Bank, Mr. Weigelt

never tried any other banks because the Bank of Salt Lake was
taking care of all his needs.
Mr. Stuart testified as a banking expert (Tr. 220) that
he would have turned down ("recommended against") Globe's initial
application to the bank but, based on perusal of the bank's
records in dealing with Globe, Globe's dealings with its lessees
and Globe's favorable eleven month "track record," he would have
done so.

Respondent submits that if other banks would have
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financed Globe's operations on July 14, 1974, as Mr. Stuart
suggested they might, they surely would not have done so on
the following date.

The evidence of that is implicit in all

the facts and circumstances surrounding the financial climate
at the time as reflected in the record.
Appellant attacks Mr. Stuart's credentials as an exper:
witness referring to him as an "alleged" expert (at page 29 of
Appellant's Brief), but respondent submits that Mr. Stuart is
an extremely qualified expert in the areas of economics, banking
and leasing as the record will reflect (Tr. 156-162).

Mr. Stuar:r

qualifications and testimony were obviously accepted and given
great weight by the court below.
At page 29 of the Brief appellant claims to have found
Mr. Stuart giving contrary testimony at pages 209 and 220 of the
trial transcript when, in fact, if taken in context, there is no
such disparate testimony.

Q: •.• do you have--have you formulated an
opinion as to whether or not Globe Leasing,
under the bank's financial situation that existed, the banking circles and lending circles in July of 1974, and with the action
of the bank in claiming ownership of the
leases and its entitlement to one of the
security deposits, the accounts of Globe
Leasing in the bank, and the directing
or the mailing of the letters such as letters
identified as 9P to Mr. Weigelt's customer,
do you know of any conceivable way that
Globe Leasing could remain in business?
(Objections omitted)
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1

A:

No.

Q:

What is the import of cash flow to a
company seeking a line of credit?

A:

Bankers rely heavily on the sources that
are to be used to be paid funds that are
advanced. If the bank can't see where
it's going to obtain those funds, usually
the loans will be denied.

Appellant speaks of the disparate testimony contained
in the trial transcript at page 220.

A careful reading of page

220 in its entirety shows no such testimony.

Respondent would

invite this Court's attention to pages 216 through page 222
wherein Mr. Stuart explains in substance that he would have
"been willing to back Globe" based on their track record were
it not for the bank's acts in terminating Globe.

At that point,

Globe's good record was suddenly undone by the actions of the
bank making another bank's extension of credit unlikely.

Mr.

Stuart's testimony throughout the record, particularly under
cross-examination, was that he would have loaned money to Globe
based on their eleven month "track record," i.e., the sum total
of all the circumstances of the 64 leases but that no bank
would loan money to Globe after July 15 in the face of the
alleged defaults which the bank's actions implied.
Appellant speculates there must have been some other
reason for Globe's inability to obtain credit from other banks
after July 15.

Appellant posits other possibilities; viz.,

the banks were simply not interested in financing leasing cornSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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panies.

All one has to do is look in the yellow pages

under automobile leasing companies to discover the abundance of said businesses.
them.

Somebody has to be financing

Appellant cites Mr. Weigelt's testimony (Tr. 72-73)

that he went to seven or eight banks to seek continued financing for Globe (unsuccessfully) and only encountered common knowledge of the "Bank of Salt Lake matter" at two
(to show, we suppose, that word of that matter really
didn't get around the banking community.)

We hardly ex-

pect a closed community like the banking circle to divulge
such knowledge to Mr. Weigelt but we hardly doubt that
such knowledge wasn't commonly held in the banking industry.

- 20 -
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III.

THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON LOST PROFITS
WAS A CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE LAW.
The older cases tended to exclude lost profits as being
too speculative in nature.

The recent cases, however, comport with

the idea that . . . "the right to recover profits claimed to have been
lost as a result of either a tort or a breach of contract is now
determined by the same rules that govern the recovery of other damages".

22 Am. Jur. 2d § 172 at 242.

profits as damages is:

(1)

The test for allowing lost

their loss is proved with a reasonable

degree of certainty; and (2) is caused by defendant's wrongful act;. Id.

Two cases decided in Utah Federal District Courts, both appealed to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals are on point.

In U.S. v.

Griffith, Gornan and Carman, Inc., 210 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1954), the
Court overruled an award of prospective lost profits because the plaintiff relied entirely on the testimony of its president who never produced the books from which he made his calculations.

The Court af-

firmed the rule that:
Prospective profits are necessarily somewhat uncertain and problematical, but in cases where
damages are definitely attributable to the wrong
of the defendant and are only uncertain as to
amount they will not be denied even though they
are difficult of ascertainment.
In Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. dba Randy's Datsun Sales
v. Nissan Motor corp. In U.S.A., 533 F. 2d 510 (1976, the 10th Cir-

cuit upheld the award of $6000,000.00 lost profits (mostly future)
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based on the testimony of an expert witness

(coincidentally the

same expert witness as in the case before bar, Mr. Stuart, usino
the same "ten-year" method of computing damages).

Over Nissan's

argument on appeal, the court said at 517, 518:
We are mindful that computations by experts cannot be based on conjecture or
be unsupported by the record (cases cited).
But, here, Stuart's damage calculations
were based on records and data that were
put into evidence through both testimony
and exhibits, all of which were available
to the jury during its deliberations.
The court further stated at page 518:
While damage claims (of lost profits) may
not be speculative, they also do not have
to be mathematically precise; it is sufficient if damages are proved to a reasonable certainty (cases cited). And, where
the defendant's wrongdoing created ti1e"1lrlcertainty, it must bear the risk of that
uncertainty and cannot complain.
(Emphasis added.)
The rules of law cited by appellant in Howarth v. Ostei
gaard, 30 Utah 183, 187, 515 P.2d 442 (1973) are correct; however
respondent would point out that in Howarth, plaintiffs wanted to.
use their mortgage as collateral for a loan from which they hope(
to buy Christmas trees which they hoped to sell for a profit, a
venture which plaintiffs apparently had not ever attempted in
past.

t:ii

This Court correctly held that damages were too speculatr

in that case.

However, in the case at bar the "Christmas trees"

were already established and capable of being projected into the
future with reasonable certainty.
A.

APPELLANT HAS MISSTATED THE NEW BUSINESS RULE.
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Appellant's argument regarding the so-called "new
business rule" is without merit.
Appellant argues that the "new business rule" precludes
recovery in this case and cites, inter alia, 22 Am Jur 2d Section
173 at 245.

Appellant is referring to the following language:
The general rule is that evidence of
expected profits from a new business
is too speculative, uncertain, and
remote to be considered and does not
meet ~he lrial standard of reasonable
certainty.

If appellant would have examined the cases cited in note 16 at 245,
appellant would have discovered that virtually all of the recent
cases cited in support of the above rule of law refer expressly to
businesses "contemplated but not yet established"

(emphasis added).

E.g. Greenwood County V. Duke Power Co., (CA4 SC) 107 F2d 484, 131
ALR 870, cert den 309 U.S. 667, 84 L.Ed. 1014, 60 S.Ct. 608 (1939):
Handley v. Guasco, 165 Cal App 2d 703, 332 P.2d 354, 359 (1958):
Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196, 279 P.2d 354, 359 (1955); Jenkins v.
Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532 (1953).
In Jenkins this Court held • . . "prospective profits to
be derived from a business which is not yet established but one
merely in contemplation are generally too uncertain and speculative
to form a basis for recovery"

(emphasis added) .

The 22 Am Jur 2d Section 173 annotation continues:
If, in the particular case, it is possible
to show, by competent evidence and with
reasonable certainty, that profits would
have been made and the amount of those
profits, they can be recovered.
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In at least one of the cases cited as authority for that languaq
Pace Corporation v. Jackson, lSS Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340, 348
(19SS), the business was not even established when the contract
was made between the parties.

A few months after the business

0

plaintiff was established, defendant withdrew from its obligaticr
of supplying plaintiff with cigarettes at a bargain price.

That

court would go even further then than did the court in the

inst~

case.
Appellant also cites 2S Corp. Jur. Sec. Section 42 at
197 in support of its position:
New or Contemplated Business. Where a new
business or enterprise is floated and damages by way of profit are claimed with respect thereto, as for its interruption or
prevention, they will generally be denied,
for the reason that such business is an
adventure, as distinguished from an established business, and its profits are speculative and remote, existing only in anticipation . • . on the other hand, lost
profits will not be derived merely because
a business is new if factual data are
available to furnish a basis for computation of probable loss of profits.
The same cases are cited as authority as were cited i:.
22 Am Jur Section 173.
Appellant also cites as controlling a Washington case.
Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Products Co., et al., 122 was'
220, 210 P. 366 (1922), a SS-year old case which is relied upon
this Court in deciding Jenkins v. Morgan, supra.

As this cour'

aware, however, Jenkins stands for the proposition that prospe
profits are too speculative when the business is only being co:
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plated and is not yet established.
Appellant's proffer of Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58,
420 P.2d 611, 618 (1941) could not be examined because the citations are erroneous.
Appellant's continued argument regarding the Carolene
~

rule as to permanence and recognition of the business again

relies upon the after acquired knowledge of the bank with respect
to the "forgery", the double financing and the Leisureamerica
leases.

Respondent will not belabor the point with respect to

appellant's tenuous reliance upon Globe's alleged "bad deeds" to
show it was not a permanent or recognized business; the court below
had the evidence before it and as the trier of fact that court
apparently found the preponderance of the evidence to weigh in
favor of the respondent on that issue.
Appellant cites further examples of "proof" of Globe's
lack of permanence at page 35 of its brief through the proffer
of Mr. Stat's testimony (TR. Vol. II 173-178) concerning three
leases.

The first example given in the record, at 175, is a ve-

hicle which the bank repossessed in December, 1975, a full year and
a half after Globe's termination; the second (at 176, 177) came
back to the bank in May, 19 76 as per agreement in "super" condition;
the third lease was terminated in April, 1976, a full twenty-one
months after Globe's termination, due to an out-of-state licensing
problem not attributed to Globe (at 178).

Respondent fails to

see what support appellant gains from the foregoing testimony.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 25 -

If

there were any problems with the individual leases we would submit that the bank's interference was the catalyst, at any rate.
At page 35 of appellant's brief the assertion is made,
"The testimony of Mr. Stuart concerning those leases was not, wi:
the exception of the problem leases to Leisureamerica, based upc
his appraisal of the soundness of any of the particular lessees'
credit."

We would again submit that it was the bank's duty by

virtue of their own insistence to appraise the soundness of ead
and every prospective lessee.

It is up to the bank, and not

Mr,

Stuart to explain the folly of appellant's ways.
Respondent argues further that appellant has not disputed that Globe's record of collection was a good one, and subr.1
that the only test appellant would seem to recommend would be an
exact measurement of profits after said profits have been realiz
Unfortunately, the bank's activities of July, 1974 preclude the
eventuality of such calculations.
Appellant attacks Mr. Stuart's credibility on yet anot·•
point, i.e., that his background is entirely with "large and sue•
ful" leasing operations operating as "adjuncts to automobile de,'
ships"

(at page 36 of appellant's brief referring to TR. 159-10

189).

There is absolutely nothing on those pages

or anywhere d

in the record to show that Globe's operation was not analogous·
the operations Mr. Stuart was familiar with.

In point of fact,

appellant's counsel asked no such questions and produced no wi:
nesses of his own to controvert Mr. Stuart's qualifications

01

testimony.
Counsel's
intrusion
in and
that
area was to hd
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Mr. Stuart agree that the previous operations within his knowledge
were, "very well run," and had been in business, "quite a number
of years"

(TR. 189).
Since appellant persists in arguing that Globe's per-

manence is suspect due to their meeting their demise upon termination of only one line of credit and, of course, the revival of the
after the fact bad acts, we should point out one's memory does not
have to be altogether perfect to recall that the summer of 1974
was marked by extremely tight money in the financial sphere.

Mr.

Stuart's explanation (TR. 195, 196) of the "Federal Funds" barometer
is very persuasive evidence of just how tight money was in the summer of 1974.
B.
THE AWARD OF LOST PROFIT WAS BASED ON COMPETENT
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT.
Mr. Stuart's calculations were valid and reliable and
were based on sound standard economic statistical analysis.

Mr.

Stuart, to determine Globe's projected growth rate, compared
the first six months' operation (an average of 3.2 leases per
month) with the last six months' operation (7.5 monthly average;
without Leisurearnerica, 5. 8 leases)

(TR. 191).

He testified that

if that growth rate continued and was verified by linear correlation and exponential smoothing, Globe would increase leases by 32
leases annually, exclusive of Leisureamerica's leases (TR. 191).
Mr. Stuart's expert opinion was that Globe's management
and accounting were "excellent" and for a new business, particularly
a leasing business with very little capital, "in all the business
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evaluations I have made, this
operations."

(Globe) was one of the better

(TR. 193.)

Mr. Stuart prepared an analysis of profit and loss

~

a lessor leasing the same number of vehicles as Globe from avaii·
able market publications and acceptable accounting methods and
determined that the price Globe would be selling their leased ca
for in the future would be consistent with market prices, theret
keeping their bad debt expense very low, as would the releasing
of repossessed automobiles

(TR. 193, 194).

He added that he di'

not add that eventuality into his computations (Globe's possible
releasing of automobiles) contrary to appellant's assertion at
page 3 8 of appellant's brief that he did so without any evidence
to support his method (emphasis added).
Using "accepted economic and accounting principles",
Mr. Stuart testified that he used a ten-year projection figure
and stated why:
There are a number of reasons why ten years
was used.
Ten years conforms to standard
practice in valuation of using the ten-times
multiplier of earnings. Ten years is also,
when applied as a multiplier, the approximate amount of the discounted present value
of stream of future receipts using exponential smoothing of cash flows.
And, third,
because the period of ten years has been
sustained by courts as a reasonable period
(TR. 213) .
Mr. Stuart then explained to the court (beginning at
TR. 214) that he prepared Exhibit 39P by using the aforementio~
ten-year projections vis a' vis "base year cash flow" and "ad]"
men ts", e.g., he subs tr acted $15, 000. 00 from the positive side
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the ledger as the estimate of Globe's losses on Leisureamerica
leases and compared the same with the economic situation in the
financial and automobile sales industry.

He then observed that

Globe's rate of growth (32 leases per year) could not be sustained
so he reduced that number to what he thought Globe could sustain,

i.e., ten new leases per year (TR. 215).
The amount that attributed to the net
cash flow associated with each new lease,
after deducting my estimate of variable
costs, was $600.00 per lease. That would
represent the amount projected for 1975
and 1976, and thereon.
Mr. Stuart's estimate which he characterized as "conservative" based on the evidence before the Court of Globe's operations
as well as the rate of growth of other leasing companies within his
knowledge, would be that Globe could expect about 164 leases ten
years from their termination by the bank (had they, of course, not
been terminated)

(TR. 215).

After discounting his figures by 6.29

percent and making other observations about his computations (TR.
215-216), Mr. Stuart estimated:
The $225,704.00 would be my estimate of
the damages because of the termination
of the business of Globe Leasing (TR. 216) .
That figure took into account payment of all "costs, expenses and
salaries"

(TR. 216).
It is a long standing rule of law that it is the trier of

fact who determines the credibility and reliability of witness testimony.

The weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented at

trial are entirely within the province of the jury, or, when tried

by the court,
within
sole
of
the
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There has been ample evidence presented by respondent
to sustain the findings of the court below.

The trial judge ha,_

the opportunity to hear the evidence, particularly the testimon;
of Mr. Stuart, and determine its sufficiency.

Appellant had th;

opportunity to rebut and cross-examine, to call witnesses, exper
or otherwise, and to present any competent evidence to con trove:
the testimony of Mr. Stuart as to the computation of lost profi:
and the projections of Globe's business future absent bank inte:
ference.

That the trial court believed there was sufficient ev

dence from which to support a judgment for respondent is appam
from the decision by that court.

The court below is the judge·

whether Mr. Stuart's computations were too remote and speculati'
to be probative.

The judgment speaks for itself.

If there is substantial evidence to
support the findings upon which the
judgment is rendered, the judgment
must be sustained.
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961).
The fact that it is difficult to calculate damages will not prevent an injured party from recovery.
However,
a judgment cannot be based on mere
speculation. Monter v. Kratzer, 29
Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40, 43 (1972).
Appellant also cites Kratzer but omits the first oft
above two sentences.

In Kratzer, Ellett, J., writing for the":

ity, held that future profits were speculative for a number oi
sons.

In the first place, there was no written agreement betwi

the defendant-counterclaimant (supplier of bakery goods) and th'
company (Continental Baking Company) to whom Kratzer was suppl
the
goods.
This
Court,
in reversing
trial
court's award
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lost profits stated that although business with Continental had
been ongoing for 17 years and had amounted to $5,000.00 per month,
a recent management change at Kratzer had apparently started a
steady decline in business to where, at the time of the interference, business was averaging only $2000.00 per month.
There was no evidence to justify an
inference that Continental would order
$2000.00 worth of products from Kratzer
(at 44) for ten years.
In Kratzer it was stipulated that gross sales were
$2000.00 per month.

No evidence was presented to show daily sales;

no expert witness was called to calculate by sound economic methods
what projected profits would be.
Respondent submits that he has met the burden of proving
up those prospective damages as the court below so found.

Kratzer was a business on the decline.
ness clearly on the rise.

Globe was a busi-

Appellant did not show any propensity

for Globe to decline or even level off.

The only evidence presented

at trial at all probative of that was Mr. Stuart's expert "conservative" opinion that Globe would increase their number of leases by
ten per year for the ensuing ten years (TR. 215) .
Appellant relies heavily on the decision of this Court
in Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 2d
187, 309 P.2d 802 (1957) wherein future profits were denied a young
attorney whose professional listing was omitted from the yellow
pages of the telephone directory.
This Court reaffirmed the rule of law in Utah as to
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1

I

The prospective profits were based on
the speculative assumption that the
potential clients lost through nonreferral would have resulted in the
referral of other clients or business
by the clients presumably lost (at 806).
Respondent is clearly distinguished from Gould.

This

Court found that future profits based on referral was too remot;
too speculative.

There is nothing in the record to indicate tho

Globe was relying on the double referral method of gaining new
business.

Mr. Stuart's calculations were based upon only ten ni

leases per year (TR. 215).
All this Court was asking in Gould was that future pli
tiffs prove their prospective profits with reasonable certainty.
In a 1975 case, Mahar v. General Motors Corporation,

a

unpublished opinion from the United States Court of Appeals, 10'.
Circuit, an appeal from the United States District Court for thE
District of Utah (attached hereto as Appendix A) has gone even
further in sustaining a verdict for prospective earnings of a
college student who had been accepted to the University of Utah
College of Law previous to having sustained the injuries sued u:
The Court relied upon the testimony of an expert economist in
fixing some $600,000.00 based on evidence of future earnings of
practicing lawyer in the State of Wyoming (at page 12).
Crockett, J., concurring with the dissent in ~ii
favor of allowing future damages, provided us with the test to
apply in determining whether the evidence will support an awaro
future damages:
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The traditionally accepted test of the
law is that a fact may be found if minds
may believe it by a preponderance of the
evidence. This means that if it can
reasonably be believed that it is more
probable than not, or that it will with
reasonable certainty occur, a finding
of such fact is justified.
(Citation
omitted.)
at 807.
Respondent submits that the proof at trial has met the
test.
When damages are obvious but difficult to prove the
wrongdoer should not benefit.
Rather than conferring an advantage upon
him, doubts should be resolved in favor
of compensating the injured person for
his equity. Id. at 808.
Equity would dictate that the "ten-year rule" is the
most just measure of damages.

Randy's Datsun, supra.

C.
THE MOTION OF THE BANK TO STRIKE MR. STUART'S
DAMAGES WERE
TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY OVERRULED.
AWARDED BASED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
COURT.
Appellant argues that Mr. Stuart's testimony should be
stricken because his opinion is based in part on the unaudited
financial statements and records of Globe (which were present in
Court and open to inspection, audit, and/or cross-examination of
appellant); and the accountant's working papers which were not
in evidence.
32 C.J.S. Section 546 (63) at 269-270 recites the following general rules of law:
(E)xperts may rely on and testify as to
factual data obtained from others.
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of others which are not in evidence but
which the expert customarily relies upon
in practice of his profession is admissible. Jenkins v. u. s., 307 F.2d 637,
641 (1962); Accord, McCormick, Evidence
Section 15 (1955), 3 Wigmore, Evidence
Section 688 (3d ed. 1940).
The Jenkins court also pointed out the "well-known pr:
tice of psychiatrists of relying upon psychologists' reports in,
of diagnosis."
32 C.J.S. Section 546

(85) continues at 269:

The fact that an expert's judgment is
not based on all the facts of the case
has been said to go to its weight rather
than to its competency.
(Citing Dunagan
v. Appalachian Power Co., 33 F.2d 876
(1929), cert. denied 50 s.ct. 152, 280
U. S. 606; Alward v. Paola, 179 P.2d 5,
9, 79 C. A. 2d l (1947).
Id. at 270:
(A)n expert's testimony, although based
on knowledge gained from inadmissible
sources, is entitled to credit where it
has the added sanction of the expert's
general experience.
The rule stated immediately above is the well settled
rule in California.

Young v. Bates Valve Bag Corporation, 52 C. ·

2d 86, 125 P.2d 840, 846.
A careful review of the record shows that Mr. Stuart:
not base his opinion entirely, or even substantially on the "un·
audited" financial statements or on the accountant's working par'
not in evidence.

He testified to relying upon Globe's general li

ger, Globe's books of original entry, all of Globe's basic doc 111'
computer runs from the appellant bank, its bank statements, depc·
tions,
jackets
containing
miscellaneous
papers
forServices
each of the'
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leases in evidence, the accountant's work sheets, exhibits 2P, 17P,
22P, 26P, 280, BP, 20P,

300, 19P, 7P, 6P, SP, 4P, 24P, Kelly "Blue

Books", N.A.O.A. "Blue Books", newsletters and handbooks published
by the automobile industry, various studies of the automobile industry, etc.

(TR. 162-165).

All of Globe's records were available for inspection by
appellant (Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).

Stuart's

identity and the materials on which his opinions would be based were
also available (Rule 26 (b) (4) (A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
The relevance of asserting that Globe's records were "unaudited" is questionable.

It is for the trial court to determine

their business sufficiency.

Defense counsel raised no objection at

trial as to the "unaudited" status of Globe's financial records.
Nor does the record reflect that appellant ever, by their own expert,
challenged the accuracy of these books of account.
Appellant's objection to Mr. Stuart's testimony being
based in part on records not in evidence also goes to, in appellant's
opinion, the trial court's going outside the evidence to render
judgment.

Appellant cites Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines

Company, 29 Utah 2d 409, 412, 503 P.2d 850, 852 (1972).
is not on point.

Park City

In that case the trial court heard the plaintiff's

expert witnesses, commented on their excellent qualifications and
testimony then based his judgment on a book unseen by either counsel
and on a computer program prepared by the judge's student-son whose
qualifications were never made known.

This Court overruled the trial

court's decision which was apparently based entirely, or almost
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entirely on information which was not on the record in the face
of sound expert testimony which was.
IV.
THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT
SUFFERED $50,000.00 DAMAGES IN LOST PROFIT AFTER
COUNTERCLAIM LOSSES OFFSETS IS SUPPORTED BY THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE EVIDENCE.
The court below found, "Globe Leasing has been damage'
by the foregoing acts and the measure is Globe Leasing's loss

0

profit • . • The Court finds the reasonable amount of lost prof:
and, therefore, damage is the sum of $50,000.00 after any clak
offsets of the Bank of Salt Lake including retention by the
Salt Lake of the above impounded funds."

~~

(Findings of Fact 9 a:

10 at R. 373).
It was testified to by Mr. Stuart that in his
opinion, damages amounted to $225, 704

(TR. 216).

e~ert

Appellant sur'

does not dispute that i t is within the province of the Court, ::
without a jury, to mitigate damages by whatever amount it feels
excessive.

The duty of the Court is to factually find to what'

tent plaintiff was damaged, i f any.

We know of no rule of law

any authority which dictates to the trier of fact that he must
itemize and explain his formula for arriving at that finding.
court is not required to be that specific.
Appellant's argument again relies on Legrand

Johns~

which we pointed out, supra, to be a rather strange case whert
absolutely !:!£ Findings of Fact were presented.
addressed by the court.

That was the

Here, the appellant complains that
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1

Findings are not enough (emphasis added) .
Respondent submits without argument that the trial court
merged any damages arising under any counterclaim of appellant into
the damage award.
CONCLUSION
Based on all the foregoing arguments and the conclusions
already reached by this Court in setting forth the facts in Globe
Leasing Corporation v. Bank of Salt Lake, 547 P.2d 197 (1976), the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed including the award
of damages and dismissal of appellant's counterclaim.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January, 1978.

ROBERT~.:~~:S-

McRAE
Attorney for Respondent
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

<::: ·

LONI F. DeLAND
Attorney for Respondent
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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and Kipp and Christian, 600 Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, as attorneys for appellant, on this 23rd day
of January, 1978.
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